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Differentiation through bargaining power in EU-Azerbaijan relations: 
Baku as a tough negotiator 
 
Eske van Gils* 
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK 
Abstract  
Using the case of democracy and human rights promotion, this paper examines the concept of 
 ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? in relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union. Post-independence, 
Azerbaijan increasingly positions itself as a strong and influential actor in the EU-Azerbaijan 
relations, demanding more discretion from the EU, based on perceivably equal input and 
interest representation. This paper argues that the EU policy-making machinery struggles to 
recognise and adjust to these demands. The EU approach, even under the 2015 ENP revision, 
remains too unilateral, causing the Azerbaijani government to resist and gain influence through 
different routes, including lobby activities. The paper concludes that EU policies and policy-
making mechanisms could become more differentiated, to reflect the political reality of 
changing power dynamics between the EU and Azerbaijan.  
 
Keywords: Azerbaijan; bargaining power; democracy promotion; differentiation; Eastern 
Partnership; European Union 
 
Introduction: The challenges of Democracy and Human Rights promotion 
 
The relations between the European Union (EU) and the countries on its eastern border  W 
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan  W are presently conducted under 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP) framework (EC 2010a). While each partnership has its own 
features, the relations between the EU and Azerbaijan present a particularly interesting case: 
they capture a changing power dynamic in the power balance between the EU and 
neighbouring countries.  
Being part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the objective of the EaP is to 
ŚĂǀĞĂ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?Žn non-EU countries in the region (interview with EEAS official 
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4, July 20141), and it is often assumed that the EU has a significant transformative influence 
on the outside (Whitman, 2013).  In the case of the EU and Azerbaijan, this transformative 
effect however appears to be rather limited, as is demonstrated by the fact that the 
democracy and human right situation in Azerbaijan has been worsening in recent years, 
despite the EU ?Ɛ values promotion efforts. This paper will shed light on the hitherto 
understudied relations between Brussels and Baku, to unpack the process of EU norms 
promotion and to identify what limits there are to EU transformative power in Azerbaijan.  
One possible explanation for the limited effect of the EU, scrutinised in this paper, is 
that both parties have their own and as a rule divergent views on how the relations should be 
shaped, as well as on the principal objectives of their relationship. European norms and values 
cannot be unilaterally transferred externally without their subsequent contextualisation. This 
paper will examine a policy area in which these dynamics are particularly visible specifically 
in EU-Azerbaijan relations - namely democracy and human rights promotion (DHR).  
DHR promotion has been chosen as a case study for two main reasons. First, it displays 
stark incongruence between the interests of the EU and Azerbaijan, being of salience for the 
former on the EaP agenda, and of limited relevance and priority for the latter. It would be 
instructive to examine the effort of both parties to reconcile the differences. Second, this case 
is also important in terms of the study of negotiation processes and bargaining power, since 
Azerbaijan appears to be an outlier compared to the other countries in the region: the EU has 
arguably had an impact on DHR reform in a number of neighbourhood countries (Ukraine, 
Armenia, Georgia but also the Western Balkans and until recently Turkey); whereas its impact 
in Azerbaijan in this area still appears to be much more limited.   
The aims of this article therefore are (i) to analyse what are the exact friction points 
between the EU and the government of Azerbaijan regarding DHR promotion; (ii) to identify 
how DHR could possibly be made a more effective policy area in bilateral relations between 
Brussels and Baku. ,ĞƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌǁŝůůĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
step in improving relations.  
This paper makes both conceptual and empirical contributions to this Special Issue, 
focusing on concrete diplomatic relations and strategic interactions between the government 
of Azerbaijan and the EU institutions. The article critiques, on the one hand, the common 
Eurocentric approaches to study EU relations with neighbouring states and values promotion 
in particular; and on the other hand, it reveals some ĐůĞĂƌ ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞh ?Ɛ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ




values promotion policies. The framework used in this paper is informed by the 
ƉŽƐƚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůŝƐƚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?.2 It acknowledges that the analysis 
and framework presented are only a modest start to explore alternative approaches to 
studying EU relations with its neighbourhood. It by no means attempts to provide a full 
framework, and should be seen as innovative contribution to the debate.  
A further disclaimer should be made at this point: the author is aware that the topic 
under discussion is controversial, in policy circles as well as in scholarly literature on values 
promotion. Examining and re-considering views on values promotion (DHR being considered 
universal values that many within Azerbaijan also aspire) is a normative exercise. This article 
however does not wish to dispute the value of DHR. Yet, it aims to find out how the issue has 
been addressed in diplomatic relations between the EU and Azerbaijan, and why it has been 
problematic, especially in recent years. In that regard, it also hopes to contribute to the 
scholarly debate on values versus strategic interests in EU policies more broadly (cf. 
Gahramanova 2009; Kavalski 2012; Kotzian et al. 2011; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Wetzel 
2011; Youngs 2010).  
The paper will now turn to a brief overview of the political context in Azerbaijan; and 
assess what are the views of the EU and the Azerbaijani government on DHR promotion 
policies. Subsequently, the conceptual framework will be introduced, discussing the notion of 
 ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?. The framework will then be applied to the analysis of official, non-
governmental and unofficial channels of communication in EU-Azerbaijan relations. Lastly, 
the article will interpret the findings from the analysis in light of the concepts of  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?
 ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞpŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?, and point out significant conclusions as well as aspects for 
further discussion.  
 
Differing DHR agendas of Brussels and Baku 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan gained independence in 1991 with the implosion of the USSR 
(Hunter in Bremmer and Taras 1993: 231). The first two years after independence the country 
was in chaos due to continued losses in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia; 
economic downturn; and in-fighting in the ruling, democratically elected Popular Front 
(Cornell 2011: 72, 75; Aliyev 2008: 170- ? ? ? ? ?ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇǁĂƐ




short-lived and after severe disputes among the political elites, President Elçibey asked 
Heydar Aliyev to intervene, and his position was soon consolidated (Cornell 2011: 77, 78). 
Aliyev had formerly been head of the Azerbaijani SSR between 1969 and 1982 (Herzig 1999: 
28).  
Once Heydar Aliyev established his power, the nature of the regime changed was 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ‘ŚǇďƌŝĚ ? W nor democratic neither clearly authoritarian (Beichelt in Stewart et al. 
2012: 17). Yet after his son Ilham Aliyev was appointed as successor, in 2003, the regime 
ŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚĂŶ “ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ? ? ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?(Beichelt in Stewart et al. 2012: 22). The incumbent 
regime in Azerbaijan, still led by President Ilham Aliyev, is therefore considered undemocratic 
according to international standards (Freedom House 2015). Opposition parties have been 
marginalised by the government (Bedford 2015) ĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐĞǀĞƌely 
limited (expert interview 3, July 2014; interview with EEAS official 2, May 2014).  
Moreover, especially in recent years, there has been a worsening situation regarding 
human rights (HRW 2016). In 2015, there were over a 100 political prisoners, comprising of 
both journalists, opposition activists, as well as religious prisoners (Freedom House 2015). 
With an expanding middle class, the fear of unrest grows and it is said that the government 
fears the possibility of a revolution (expert interview 3, July 2014). The ensuing result is a 
crackdown and harassment of any critical voices.  
 
ǯȂ two decades without results 
 
Democracy and human rights (DHR) promotion is a recurring transformative objective of the 
EU in relations with Azerbaijan (see e.g. EC 2001, 2004, 2011). DHR promotion has taken place 
ever since 1991, across a range of policy frameworks and instruments. These included the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1997 (EC 1996a); the NIP/CSP (EC 2001); the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (EC 2004) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) (EU 
Council 2009). Yet the matter has become one of the most problematic issues in bilateral 
relations, especially in recent years. The PCA framework focused less on values and political 
affairs, and more on economic and technical co-operation (EC 1996b); and hence there was 
not such strong demand for differentiation coming from the Azerbaijani side. But values 
promotion has received much more attention especially since 2010, when the EU and 




Azerbaijan began negotiations over the heavily politicised Association Agreement (AA) as a 
follow-up to the PCA (EC 2010b). This is when the Azerbaijani government also started to 
voice its wish for a more tailor-made policy without such values dimension, more strongly. 
During these years, frictions between the two sides over DHR promotion have become more 
visible, with the DHR situation deteriorating and the EU placing more emphasis on the matter; 
and with a stronger use of diplomatic strategies by the regime in Baku, to enforce a more 
differentiated policy. Therefore, the analysis in this paper will focus on this period after 2010, 
mostly.  
Remarkably, while democracy and human rights are usually mentioned in one breath, 
there has been a separation of the two areas in practice. Democracy promotion is a relevant 
element for the EU in its relations with Baku, although at the same time there seems to be an 
acceptance that while the regime of President Aliyev is not democratic, at least it preserves 
stability, and there may be no credible alternative at this moment (expert interview 3, July 
2014). This does not mean that the EU accepts the current form of governance in Azerbaijan; 
however, the democracy promotion efforts are probably not as strong as they could be.  
Human rights promotion, however, has been the main issue of values promotion for 
the EU, particularly in recent years, since the Azerbaijani government is targeting political 
opposition and youth activists as well as journalists to an increasing extent (HRW 2015; 
interview with Member State official 1, May 2014). In 2016, several prominent and well-
known prisoners of conscience were released by the government, but many remained 
imprisoned. Some argue that these successes were due to external pressure, among others 
from the EU and EU Member States (interview with Member State official 1, May 2014; IWPR 
2016)3.  
 Recent events however, ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞh ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ,ZƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ
in Azerbaijan. In September 2015 the European Parliament submitted a resolution that 
condemned the human rights violations in Azerbaijan (EP 2015). A few days later, the 
Azerbaijani authorities again arrested a number of journalists (CPJ 2015) and the government 
announced it would re-consider several aspects of co-operation with the EU (interview with 
EEAS official 6, October 2015; APA 2015). Similar events have occurred in previous years. The 
h ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚůǇƵŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů PǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞh ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ ‘ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇ
ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶĂŬƵĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŚƵŵĂŶ
rights activists. This seems to ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐƌĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂƐŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ




ƚŚĞ ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶŝ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽ-ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? dŚŝƐ ƉĂƉĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůysis of diplomatic communication 




While naturally every country has their own preferences in bilateral relations with the EU, 
Azerbaijan differs from most of these partner countries for two main reasons. First, the 
Azerbaijani government demands a more equal relationship based on partnership and 
reciprocity. While the EU traditionally is confronted with neighbouring countries who wish to 
obtain closer co-operation and even integration with the EU, in the case of Azerbaijan it 
almost seems to be the opposite. Azerbaijan is unsatisfied with the current, rather 
undifferentiated, framework that is offered by the EU, because Azerbaijan feels that the 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŶŽǁ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ƚŚŽƐĞ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ? /ƚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ĂƐŬƐ ĨŽƌ
differentiation in the form of a tailor-made policy rather than one uniform approach to all 
six EaP countries (Paul in Chiragov et al. 2015, 83; Pashayeva in Chiragov et al. 2015, 39). Baku 
does want co-operation with the EU, but predominantly in technical and economic areas 
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?/ƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐǀĂůƵĞƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ
ĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚ^ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂl 2, May 2014; Cornell 2011, 395).  
 Furthermore, Azerbaijan differs from the other EaP states in that the government 
openly challenges the current lack of equality, and insists on resetting the dialogue on an 
equal footing, rather than simply conforming tŽƚŚĞh ?ƐƐĞƚŽĨĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ4. Azerbaijan, slowly 
overcoming much of the difficulties of the transition period after independence, is positioning 
itself as an increasingly strong actor in international politics through for instance enrichment 
of its diplomatic corps, a pro-active stance towards Brussels and other European capitals, the 
organisation of large international events, and an explicit political discourse. TŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
disinterest in the current format inevitably destabilises the balance of power in the bilateral 
relations between Azerbaijan and the EU, nudging their relations to a more symmetrical 
model of communication and exchange. However, this is not yet reflected in the policy-
making mechanisms, as will be shown in the sections below.   
 






DƵĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƚŽƌǇ ƚŽ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ƚŚĞ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ,Z ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ŝŶ ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ? KŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ
arguments put forward is that the EU cannot afford to have a strong normative agenda in 
Azerbaijan because of its dependence on Azerbaijani oil, as well as other strategic interests, 
including trade in other areas and Azerbaijan being Ă  ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂůůǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ  ?ƐĞĞĞ ?Ő ? 
Wetzel 2011; MacFarlane in Dannreuther 2004; Warkotsch 2006; Hale 2012). The importance 
ŽĨ ĞŶĞƌŐǇ ƚƌĂĚĞ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ďĞ ĚĞŶŝĞĚ ǁŚĞŶ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝĐǇ-making in regards to 
Azerbaijan, and some of the differences of the DHR approach in comparison to EU relations 
with other countries can possibly be explained by the significance of these strategic interests. 
One obvious comparison is Belarus  W where the EU takes a much tougher stance regarding 
the undemocratic regime (see also Franke et al. 2010: 173). At the same time, in comparison 
to other partner states with strategic interests (e.g. Russia, China, or the Central Asian 
republics), there is relatively much attention for DHR in Azerbaijan. Crucially, and regardless 
of comparisons with other states, while tŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ĨŽƌ ,Z ƌĞĨŽƌŵ ŚŝŶĚĞƌƐ ƚŚĞ
partnership with Azerbaijan, the EU nevertheless continues its DHR promotion efforts. This 
suggests that the dynamics are more complex than merely reflecting strategic interests. 
Possibly, energy plays an indirect role, by providing the Azerbaijani government with the 
economic independence and the bargaining chips to enforce a stronger position in 
negotiations with the EU  W as will be shown later on in the analysis.  
Yet this paper argues that it is not the absence of the EU transformative pressure, but 
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽŝƚƚŚĂƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇƚŚĞ
latter succeeds at harnessing ƚŚĞh ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĂŶĚƚŚis way, side-lining DHR from the agenda. 
The assumption of this paper ŝƐ ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ƌĞƐŝƐƚƐ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ďǇ ǁĂǇ ŽĨ
demanding its equal-footing participation in the decision-making process, and by appealing 
for a differentiated policy. It can do so because of its relatively strong leverage that the 
government manages to apply in a strategic manner.  
Differentiation is a process which allows designing policies in bilateral relations on the 
basis of common interests of both parties. Since every country has their own specific national 
policy priorities and interests, bilateral relations between the EU and each EaP partner could 
also be conducted on an individual basis. This interpretation of differentiation is therefore 




different from the one the EU currently employs itself. As was described in the Introduction 
to thŝƐ ǀŽůƵŵĞ ? ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚƐ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ Ă ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ  ‘ĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ h
standard, by way of selective participation in policy initiatives; rather than seeking to 
ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚǁŝƚŚƐƉĂĐĞĨŽƌŝŶƉƵƚĨƌŽŵďŽƚŚƐŝĚĞƐ (Balfour 2014, 2). 
dŚĞh ?ƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽďĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐƉŚĞƌĞŽĨ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? W that is, set to 
ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƐĞƚŽĨ ƌƵůĞ ƚŽĞŶĨŽƌĐĞ ŝƚƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ  ?ĚŬŝŶƐ  ? ? ? ? ?  W and technocratised, 
suggesting a prescriptive technical list of policy elements from which partner states cannot 
 ‘ŽƉƚŽƵƚ ? ?ƐǁŝůůďĞƐŚŽǁŶůĂƚĞƌŝŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐŶŽƚŚŝƚŚĞƌƚŽ
been successful and requires a new understanding, as the case of Azerbaijan demonstrates.  
As said, Azerbaijan seeks a differentiated, tailor-made policy approach, in which both Baku 
ĂŶĚƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ?ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ?
The analysis will examine how interaction between the EU and Azerbaijan has worked 
out regarding DHR since 2010, and to what extent differentiation has been achieved by the 
Azerbaijani government. What the analysis will find is that Azerbaijan has relatively much 
bargaining power in comparison to other EaP countries. Bargaining power is a concept 
borrowed from negotiation and mediation literature, and can be defined as the stronger or 
weaker position that an actor manages to obtain in the policy-making process. The 
assumption is that bargaining power allows actors to curb pressure from other actors 
(defensive power) and/or to influence relations with the other (offensive power) (Goldmann 
and Sjöstedt 1979, 13-4). This bargaining power would allow Baku to enforce a more 
differentiated agenda that includes its own interests as well as those of Brussels. The other 
EaP states may also have bargaining power, but to a lesser extent and/or in more indirect 
ways compared to Azerbaijan.  
The analysis is predominantly based on interviews conducted in Baku and Brussels in 
2014 and 2015, as well as policy documents, literature on the topic, and media accounts when 
it concerned on-going affairs. By aggregating data, the negotiation process has been 
reconstructed, and developments have been interpreted on the basis of these narratives. 
While this method is not ideal due to issues of interviewee bias and selectivity, it was found 
that there is limited alternative data available on EU-Azerbaijan relations, and access to 
several relevant EU policy documents was either denied or granted, subject to heavy 
censorship, on grounds that DHR promotion is a sensitive and on-going policy issue.  




 dŽĐůĂƌŝĨǇ PƚŚĞ ‘h ?ŚĞƌĞƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚŽƐĞhŝŶƐƚŝƚƵ ŽŶƐĂŶĚĂĐƚŽƌƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ
involved in diplomatic contact and negotiations on a bilateral level, namely the EEAS, the EU 
Delegation in Baku, and the EU Member States5 ?  ‘ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ? ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
Azerbaijani government, which, considering its centralised structure, denotes the President, 
the Presidential Administration, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As will be shown in the 
section on EU cooperation with civil society, the EU does not exploit opportunities to work 
together with non-government actors, to the full. Naturally, both EU and Azerbaijani decision-
making structures are more complex and involve more actors. However, for the sake of clarity, 
this analysis will focus on these core actors. The level of analysis is diplomatic relations 
between the Azerbaijani government and EU institutions: these actors will express the official 
line, which can be presumed to be the end result of complex decision-making on a domestic 
level. That final outcome will serve as the starting point for this analysis.  
 
The policy-making process: Azerbaijan as a tough negotiator 
 
The following analysis assesses interaction between EU institutions and the Azerbaijani 
government concerning DHR promotion policies. It will approach policy-making in bilateral 
relations as a negotiation process between two partners. The three formats of negotiation 
that will be discussed are (i) official channels of interaction between the EU and the 
Azerbaijani government; (ii) non-governmental channels: the EU and Azerbaijani civil society; 
and lastly (iii) unofficial channels: lobbying activities in Brussels. Due to the limited scope of 
this paper, the discussion of all three channels of communication is not all-encompassing. 
Rather, the section below serves as an illustration of the three forms of communication, and 
will provide selective evidence rather than a full overview.  
 
Official channels of communication 
 
The main channel of communication is official visits of high EU and Member State officials to 
Baku and of Azerbaijani representatives to Brussels (interview with EEAS official 5, July 2014; 
interview with Azerbaijani government representative 3, May 2015). Meetings take place on 
both a bilateral and multilateral level (expert interview 2, May 2014; interview with Member 
State official 1, May 2014).  




Official visits are a good occasion for the Azerbaijani government to communicate its 
own interests and desired strategy (expert interview 2, May 2014; interviews with Azerbaijani 
government representatives, 2 and 3,  July 2014 and May 2015). Yet while bilateral meetings 
could be an opportunity for negotiation, it has been suggested that the chances for a true 
dialogue between the two are minimised because of different negotiation cultures (interview 
with EEAS official 2, May 2014). Generally, there may not always be the same level of 
understanding between the two sides. For example, :ŽƐĞDĂŶƵĞůĂƌƌŽƐŽ ?ƐǀŝƐŝƚƚŽĂŬƵŝŶ
June 2014 for instance revealed two weak spots in the relations. First, the Strategic 
Modernisation Partnership was supposed to be signed during this visit, but Azerbaijan 
decided not to (interview with EEAS official 4, July 2014). Second, within the two weeks after 
ĂƌƌŽƐŽ ?ƐƚƌŝƉ ?ZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐŵĂĚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůǀŝƐŝƚƐƚŽĂŬƵĨŝǀĞƚŝŵĞƐ ?ŽŶĂůů ůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝtical 
hierarchy (interview with Azerbaijani government representative 2, July 2014; see also Paul 
in Chiragov et al. 2015, 81). The government is pressurised to conduct a foreign policy of 
balancing and it needs to make a trade-off between certain policy areas to secure its relations 
with all key partners (the EU, Russia, and Turkey). This makes it difficult for Baku to sign 
agreements with a strong political dimension with the EU,6 yet Brussels does not seem to 
acknowledge this, by for a long time having retained its emphasis on the Association 
Agreement (interview with EEAS official 6, October 2015) ĂŶĚƚŚĞŚŝŐŚůǇ ‘ĚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ ? W that 
is rigidly shaped by the EU standards alone (Edkins 1999)  W DHR promotion policy.  
It should be noted that in 2015 Azerbaijan proposed a new format - the Strategic 
Partnership Agreement - and this time the EU did not reject it outright (interview with EEAS 
official 6, October 2015). In principle, this  could offer an opportunity to develop a more 
differentiated approach. In May 2016, the EEAS was given a mandate by the EU Council to 
commence negotiations with the Azerbaijani government on this agreement 
(Trend/Idayatova 2016); at the time of writing, it remains to be seen how differentiation is 
being brought into practice.  
A second key area indicating who decides the rules of the game is that of Progress 
Reports. For each of the ENP countries, an Action Plan with the main policy points is 
established for a period of several years. Action Plan results are evaluated in Progress Reports 
ĂŶŶƵĂůůǇ ?^ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵĂƌĞĂƐǁŚĞƌĞĂĐƚƵĂů ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ?ƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚƐŵĂŝŶůǇ
seem to highlight perceived shortcomings on behalf of the partner states, including DHR, 
which suggests that there is a gap between the expectations set out in the Action Plans, and 




developments in reality. In the case of Azerbaijan, for one, Progress Reports have become 
more critical over time, and Azerbaijan has in turn expressed its reluctance about these 
Reports.  
dŚĞh ?ƐWƌŽŐƌĞƐƐZĞƉŽƌƚŝƐĂƐƵďũĞĐƚof discussion in the Azerbaijani media (interviews 
with EEAS official 1, April 2014 and 12, July 2014). The government often expresses its 
ŝŶĚŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞh ?ƐǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǌĞƌďĂŝũŶŝĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐƵƐƵĂůůǇǁƌŝƚĞĂĨŽƌŵĂů
report in response to the Progress Report, based on information collected from all its 
Ministries (interview with EEAS official 1, April, 2014). The government is becoming 
increasingly vocal in other areas, and no longer takes EU criticism or disagreement for granted 
(expert interview 2, May 2014). Azerbaijani civil society produces a report for the EU as well 
(interview with EEAS official 5, July 2014). 
According to one EEAS official, the Progress Reports have become especially critical 
since 2011 (interview with EEAS official 1, April 2014); according to the EU the policies in 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĐŽŵĞ ŵŽƌĞ  ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚĞĚ ? ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ŐŝǀŝŶŐ ŵŽƌĞ
room for targeted criticism (interview with EEAS official 5, July 2014). The question is whether 
ƚŚĞh ?ƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚĚŝfferentiation regarding criticism on DHR matters is a result of contextual 
factors (see also Wetzel and Orbie 2011), or instead an active, intentional decision to treat 
countries in the ENP differently according to their specific needs and context of relations. In 
fact, by adhering to the DHR promotion policy as in other EaP states while Azerbaijan has 
made clear that it is not interested in such co-operation, the EU seems to have a uniform 
rather than a differentiated approach in this policy area.  
The EU and Azerbaijan also communicate through the Cooperation Council (CC), which 
brings together representatives from the European Council and the Azerbaijani MFA (expert 
interview 2, July 2014). Bilateral meetings of the EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation Council have 
taken place ever since the PCA came into force in 1999 (EU Council 2004, 1). What can be 
seen from an analysis of the agenda items and issues discussed in the EU-Azerbaijan CC 
meetings over time is that DHR seem to have gained a more prominent role on the agenda 
since 2009. This possibly reflects an increase of importance attached to political matters in 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ? ĂŶĚ ŽŶĐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? dŚĞ  ?Ɛ
parliamentary counterpart, the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCC), brings 
together representatives of the Azerbaijani Parliament, and the European Parliament 
Delegation for the South Caucasus. Generally, the PCC tends to take more consideration of 




the priorities and views of Azerbaijan; whereas the CC clearly reflĞĐƚƐƚŚĞh ?ƐůŝŶĞ ?ƚƚŚĞ
same time, however, no PCC meeting took place in 2013, on the request from Azerbaijan, 
ŽǁŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞh ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌƐĞŶŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ
with EEAS official 4, July 2014, and 6, October 2015). 
A last point to note here is that the Azerbaijani government increasingly makes use of 
the strategy of ͚ůŝŶŬĂŐĞ͛ in these official channels of communication, whereby seemingly 
unrelated policy issues are connected and progress in certain areas is made conditional on 
negotiations in other fields. Azerbaijan has critiqued DHR promotion in discussions over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process (expert interview 4, May 2015), as well as in 
negotiations over the Association Agreement and Strategic Partnership Agreement (interview 
with EEAS official 6, October 2015), thus adding pressure to the EU to reconsider its values 
promotion policies and to allow a more differentiated policy.  
This assessment of official channels of communication shows that Azerbaijan 
successfully avoids cooperation in the field of values, in particular democracy and human 
rights and freedoms, and only wants their relations to focus on domains correspondent with 
its own interests (interview with EEAS official 2, May 2014; interview with Member State 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů  ? ? DĂǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ? dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ĐŚĞƌƌǇ ƉŝĐŬŝŶŐ ? ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ƚŝŵĞƐ ŝŶ
interviews with representatives from the EU or EU member states, in this respect. While the 
hŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐŚĞƌƌǇƉŝĐŬŝŶŐ ?ŝƐƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ? and that they cannot agree with it taking 
place (interview with Member State official 1, May 2014), it is happening nonetheless. 
Through such selectivity, the government can also meet one of its own priorities, namely 
securing domestic stability and maintaining legitimacy.  
 
Non-governmental channels: the EU and Azerbaijani civil society 
 
If there is no or limited socialisation on the level of the government, international actors can 
try to cooperate with the opposition and (parts of) civil society to attempt to bring about 
democratisation (Flockhart 2005, 58). Apart from the Azerbaijani authorities, the EU 
therefore also cooperates with civil society organisations and human rights defenders in 
Azerbaijan (interview with EEAS official 5, July 2014; EU Council 2011, 7; EC 2012, 3). Domestic 
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŵĂǇ ůĂǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ? ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƐĞůĨ-perceived role as a 




normative power  W this is reflected in ƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƐƉƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůǀĂůƵĞƐ ? (interview 
with EEAS official 5, July 2014). Efforts here seem to focus mostly on democracy, rather than 
human rights promotion (see e.g. EC 2004, 2011). 
Yet some critical notes can be detected too: CSOs themselves feel that they are not 
being heard by Brussels, even though they feel they could contribute more towards 
disseminating their knowledge to the EU (expert interview 1, May 2014). Civil society also 
tries to make recommendations to the EU as well as to the Azerbaijani government through 
joint policy papers, but the main problem indicated is that there is no bridge between the 
CSOs and the government. Civil society would like to see the EU Delegation in Baku taking a 
greater role in that process (idem). Another key issue is that while co-operation between civil 
society and the EU Delegation is good (expert interview 3, May 2014; interview with EEAS 
official 2, May 2014), there are almost no connections between civil society and the actual 
policy-makers in Brussels (expert interview 1, May 2014). This way, their influence on policy-
making is even further diminished.  
Azerbaijani CSOs are found to be the most active within the Eastern Partnership 
(interview with EEAS official 2, May 2014). But civil society seems to have an impact only in 
so far as it can cooperate with the EU independently.7 dŚĞh ?s budget for CSOs however, is 
established in co-operation with the government only; CSOs themselves have no say in the 
allocation of money,8 which does not help the effecƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?expert 
interview 1, May 2014). It can be assumed that this provides the government with another 
form of power to circumvent value promotion, through input over the budget. Another source 
ŽĨŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝƐƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂŵŽƵŶƚƐŽĨĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
to NGOs, and thus allure them away from EU programmes (interview with EEAS official 2, May 
2014). Moreover, as it is very difficult for truly independent NGOs to register in Azerbaijan, 
the result is that mainly government-operated NGOs (GONGOs) are involved and supported 
by the EU instruments (idem). Azerbaijani civil society seems disappointed in the support they 
ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh ?ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚŚĞh ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐĨŽƌĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ? ?
May 2014).  
This seems a contradictory finding: one would expect the EU to make full use of its 
potential to promote DHR through non-governmental channels. One possible explanation 
could be a simple lack of human resources in the EEAS  W in particular since 2013 the EU is 
indeed occupied with Ukraine more than with other EaP states (expert interview 3, July 2014).  







Azerbaijan is much concerned about its image in the international community (interview with 
Member State official 1, May 2014). The government invests heavily in public diplomacy to 
promote Azerbaijan abroad; but also domestically one can see how large infrastructure and 
big events are meant to impress visitors as well as citizens. Public diplomacy and lobby 
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞƚǁŽŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐƵƐĞĚŝŶǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?Ɛ,ZƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǀŝƐ-à-vis the 
EU. In recent years, Azerbaijan has become famous (or notorious) for its use of these 
unconventional policy tools to influence EU decision-making in Brussels (see e.g. ESI 2012). 
dŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŚĂƐ ĞǀĞŶ ŚŝƌĞĚ WZ ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ƚŽ ƉŽůŝƐŚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ŝŵĂŐĞ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ
democracy and human rights in Brussels (expert interview 3, July 2014).  
ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĐĂŶďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƐĞůĨ-perception as a growing 
economic and political power. Azerbaijan feels that at the end of the 1990s, when the country 
was weak because of the state of its economy and the war over Nagorno-Karabakh, it had to 
make concessions to be allowed into the Council of Europe in 2001 (expert interview 3, July 
2014). The current economic strength would give Baku the courage to show Europe that it 
can do things its own way (expert interview 3, July 2014; interview with EEAS official 5, July 
2014). The nature of the economy, Azerbaijan being an energy producer, would also facilitate 
ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚ^ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů4, July 2014).  
And Brussels appears to be affected by the lobby. The Observation Mission of the EP 
Delegation to the Presidential elections in October 2013 led to a scandal when their report 
clashed with the findings of the OSCE (interview with EEAS official 4, July 2014; expert 
interview 3, July 2014). The Mission was overly positive of the elections, whereas other 
international organisations assessed that the elections were neither free nor fair (interview 
with EEAS official 4, July 2014). Eight members of the Delegation initially refused to declare 
who financed their trip, and later appeared to have been funded by the Azerbaijani 
government (idem). This caviar diplomacy (Knaus 2015) is not limited to the Observation 
DŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ^ĞǀĞƌĂů ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ  ‘ďƵǇƐ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
Parliament (expert interview 3, July 2014; ESI 2012). Following the EP elections in May 2014 
a new Delegation to the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee was established. A number of 
members of the previous Delegation are no longer in Parliament. 







The previous section discussed three different channels of communication in the policy-
making process in which the power of the EU and Azerbaijan differed. It was found that the 
EU ?Ɛ ƐƚĂŶĐĞ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ,ZƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶ leaves no room for a differentiated policy in which 
ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?s views and interests are taken into account. However, Azerbaijan seems to have 
found mechanisms and pathways to circumvent EU pressure for DHR reform through these 
channels: firstly, as mentioned earlier in this paper, via official channels Azerbaijan can ignore 
EU pressure due to its relatively independent position as an actor; second, the Azerbaijani 
government has its own mechanisms to weaken and close down domestic opposition; third, 
the government makes use of unofficial channels of communication to undermine the effect 
ŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐǀĂůƵĞƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ? Azerbaijan ŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚƐƵĐĐĞĞĚŝŶĂůƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞh ?ƐǀĂůƵĞƐ
promotion policy, but can hinder the implementation of it, when it considers the policies 
insufficiently differentiated and not tailored to its own national interests. 
&ƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĞĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ?ŝƚĐĂŶďĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh ?Ɛ,ZƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ-
date has been unsuccessful because it has not taken into consideration or has not been able 
to respond appropriately to the (re)action of the Azerbaijani government. In other words, the 
h ?ƐƚŽŽůƐĂŶĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĚŽŶŽƚƐĞĞŵƌŝŐŚƚĨŽƌƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ?ĂŝŵƐ ?As this volume argues, the EU 
needs a better understanding and engagement with the othering process, including its core 
element  W differentiation.9  
Notably, tŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŝŶĂŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞǁĂǇ ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇƚŚĞ
Self (in this case, the EU) constructs its own identity by reflecting negatively on the identity of 
the Other (here Azerbaijan) (Diez 2005; Prozorov 2011). The function of negatŝǀĞ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?
often provides the EU with internal legitimacy justifying its values promotion policies in 
relations with the less developed states (Diez 2005). dŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŽĨ ‘ŶĂŵŝŶŐĂŶĚƐŚĂŵŝŶŐ ?
has however not been effective in Azerbaijan. One possibility worth exploring would be for 
ƚŚĞhƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶƐƚĞĂĚǁŝƚŚĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?10 In this case, the Other is seen as 
a legitimate partner, rather than an inferior or violating universal principles, which allows, for 
instance, to resume official channels of communication such as the PCC or CC meetings; and 
this way, to overcome the deadlock in existing relations. 




Furthermore, positive othering may also facilitate differentiation, a process which 
allows designing policies in bilateral relations on the basis of common interests of both parties. 
The analysis has shown how Azerbaijan insists on having its own specific national policy 
priorities and interests represented in relations with the EU, through management of 
relations on an individual, tailor-made basis rather than through a regional framework. This 
interpretation of differentiation is therefore different from the one the EU currently employs 
itself (cf. EC 2003). As was described in the Introduction to this volume, Brussels interprets 
differentiation as a form ŽĨ ‘ĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?ďǇǁĂǇŽĨƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ
ŝŶƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚǁŝƚŚƐƉĂĐĞ
for input from both sides, allowing for diversity, instead. The EU does indeed not seem to be 
open to the idea of equal input from Azerbaijan. In the area of values, there still seems to be 
a notion of ƚŚĞh ?Ɛsuperiority over the values and traditions practised by the Azerbaijani 
government. When asked about the willingness to work together on creating shared values, 
ŽŶĞ^ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh ?ƐǀĂůƵĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƐƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ
there could not be a compromise on that (interview with EEAS official 5, July 2014).  
Azerbaijan in turn ĨĞĞůƐƚŚĂƚ ŝƚƐŽǁŶƉŽůŝĐǇƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚ ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
security concerns are not sufficiently considered (interviews with Azerbaijani government 
representatives 1, May 2014; and 2, July 2014; and 3, May 2015 ? ?ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?ƐƉerception is 
ƚŚĂƚ ĂŬƵ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŐŝǀĞŶ ĂŶǇ  ‘ŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ƚŚĂƚ ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ
equally in these relations (interviews with Azerbaijani government representatives 1, May 
2014; and 2, July 2014). One big issue of friction seems to be that Azerbaijan has the idea that 
the EU in turn is not willing to make any concessions, and that it sometimes acts inconsistently. 
dŚĞhŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŶŽƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƚƌƵůǇ ‘ƚƌƵƐƚǁŽƌƚŚǇ ?ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?interview with Azerbaijani 
government representative 2, July 2014). 
ĞƐƉŝƚĞǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?ƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŵĂǇhowever not be in 
the position to do anything more than avoiding certain policies that are related to the 
ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽĨhǀĂůƵĞƐ ?tŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞh ?ƐǀŝĞǁŽŶƚŚĞcreation of shared values 
ĂŶĚĂŶŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞƉŽůŝĐǇǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŵďŝŶĞƐhĂŶĚǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ŝƚǁĂƐĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞ h ƚĂŬĞƐ ŝŶƚŽ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ďǇ ŶŽƚ ĨŽƌĐŝŶŐ ĂŶǇ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞŵ P
Azerbaijan would be free to reject co-operation in certain areas (interview with EEAS official 
3, May  ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ĞƋƵĂůŝŶƉƵƚ ?ŝŶƉŽůŝĐǇ-making 
consists of the EU proposing initial policies and programmes, and Azerbaijan choosing 




whether or not to engage in these. This of course contradicts earlier statements about the 
non-acceptance of selective behaviour by Azerbaijan.  
The analysis in this paper has demonstrated that the current, undifferentiated 
approach has been unsuccessful and is unlikely to become so. The result of this narrow and 
technocratic idea of differentiation by the EU therefore is a deadlock: Azerbaijan now simply 
ŝŐŶŽƌĞƐƚŚĞh ?Ɛ,ZƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂůůƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂĚŚĞƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞh ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ
regarding democracy or political affairs, the country will instead go in defence. While an EU-
based, more standardised policy towards much of its neighbourhood is rational (because 
efficient) for the EU, this framework is now meeting resistance from Azerbaijan. One 
Azerbaijani interviewee stated that the EU ĐĂŶŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇĂƉƉůǇŝƚƐŽǁŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ‘ŝŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚ
ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǇǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶŝŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?DĂǇ
 ? ? ? ? ? ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ďǇ ŽƌŶĞůů ?Ɛ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚ  “ŚĂƐ ŚĂĚ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ
problems with its deliveƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ?ŽĨǀĂůƵĞs promotion (Cornell 2011, 401).   
The result of this narrow and technocratic idea of differentiation by the EU is a 
ĚĞĂĚůŽĐŬ PǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶŶŽǁƐŝŵƉůǇ ŝŐŶŽƌĞƐƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ,ZƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂůů ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ. This 
suggests that the EU should perhaps consider re-politicising this debate and allowing a 
differentiated approach that would include ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ. This is where the concept of 
 ?the political ? comes to play a key role. Edkins has described how much of politics is conducted 
in a depoliticised ŵĂŶŶĞƌ ? ůĞĂǀŝŶŐ ŶŽ ƐƉĂĐĞ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇ  ‘pŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?
interaction between actors over policies (1999, 2). We have seen this happening in EU-
Azerbaijan relations, too, as was shown in the analysis on official channels of communication: 
there is no room for a contestation of the current DHR promotion policies, and both the EU 
and Azerbaijan hold their ground without wanting to make any concessions. The result has 
been that progress in this policy area has halted: there is almost no contact anymore at an 
official level, civil society cannot flourish in the way the EU says it would like to, and the 
Azerbaijani government can undermine the implementation of EU policies through unofficial 
channels of comŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌŝŶŐŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞpŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ďĂĐŬŝŶƚŽƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƌĞ-considering the 
DHR promotion policies, could possibly lead to a renewed dynamic.  
One possible step that has been suggested is to discuss DHR at a private -i.e. behind 
closed doors  W instead ŽĨĂƚĂƉƵďůŝĐůĞǀĞů ?ƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞh ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐƚŽƉƵďůŝĐůǇĂĐĐƵƐĞ
the Azerbaijani government for breaching international DHR standards, yet it appears that 
this strategy is counterproductive in the case of Azerbaijan (EU interviews, 2014). Rather than 




ĂĚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ Ěemocracy or political reform, the country will 
instead go in defence. We have seen this happening even recently, when President Aliyev 
stated that Baku will not listen to European accusations (Azeri Report 2015). According to 
some, a dialogue at a private level, behind closed doors, could be much more constructive 
and is already applied by some member states, believing this is more effective (interview with 
Member State official 1, May 2014).11 Another form of re-politicising the debate could be to 
cut the link between politics and other areas for cooperation. While moving away from a 
depoliticised policy towards a more politicised form of interaction seems sensible on paper, 
this naturally poses a serious dilemma for the EU: can Brussels afford to open up its values 
promotion policies to discussion with autocratic regimes? The EU considers itself a normative 
actor (Manners 2013) and being pragmatic on these issues for the sake of possible long-term 
effectiveness brings along serious challenges. First, the question is whether the EU could 
afford to do so on a domestic level, without losing its legitimacy. Moreover, reducing DHR 
pressures on Azerbaijan might set a precedent for relations with other authoritarian regimes, 
and it is unlikely that all Member States could reach consensus on such move - notably Poland 
and Sweden would likely object considering their leadership role in DHR promotion policies 
towards Belarus. Third, differentiating on such level would undoubtedly cause friction with 
the Azerbaijani opposition forces; it seems nearly impossible for the EU to make any 
concessions especially regarding political prisoners. Lastly, one could interpret a move to 
differentiation as a form of power of the Azerbaijani government, since it would achieve that 
international actors do not show public criticism of the regime.  
 
Conclusion and further discussion: Enforcing differentiation?  
 
This paper has examined the case of DHR in relations between the EU and Azerbaijan. By 
viewing policy-making in relations as a negotiation process, it has been possible to assess the 
interaction between Brussels and Baku in this policy area. The EU and the Azerbaijani 
government hold different views on the role DHR promotion policies should play in bilateral 
relations: while the EU adheres to a values-driven agenda, the regime led by president Aliyev 
would prefer co-operation without this values dimension, and aspires a more differentiated 
pŽůŝĐǇ ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ?It was found that 




Azerbaijan strategically applies several policy tools and negotiation tactics to enforce 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ Wwhich in turn undermine the DHR pressures undesired 
by the government in Baku. From the case study it appears that differentiation only takes 
place to the extent that Azerbaijan has the bargaining power to enforce this. The EU maintains 
control over official policy-making mechanisms as well as in relations with Azerbaijani civil 
society, as a result of which there is no or very limited differentiation and the EU maintains 
the power to keep implementing a largely unchanged policy  W but to no avail. The government 
ŝŶĂŬƵŵĂŶĂŐĞƐƚŽƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞ h ?s transformative effect through unofficial channels 
(mostly public diplomacy activities in Brussels), and is therefore able to represent its own 
interests in relations better, despite the lack of differentiation.  
 One possible option for the EU to have a transformative effect and to solve the 
deadlock, is the creation of shared values and ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ  ‘othering ?  W to be reflected in a 
differentiated policy. This could result in a contestation of norms of both sides rather than 
mere adherence to those of the EU PǁŚĂƚĚŬŝŶƐĐĂůůƐ ‘ƚŚĞpŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?. But given that 
ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶŝƐŽŶůǇĂďůĞƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚƚŚĞh ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ so far, but is not yet able to actively shape 
the official agenda, we cannot yet speak of genuine contestation or inclusive policy-making. 
Currently, there appears to be a clear misperception of asymmetry: both feel the other needs 
them more than they do in real terms; and hence the two parties are not willing to 
compromise.  
The current DHR promotion policies have proven unsƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ĂŶĚ ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?Ɛ
demands for differentiation are growing. The findings from the analysis suggest that a policy 
also supported by the Azerbaijani government is more likely to succeed than the current, one-
sided governance of the EU, whereby its DHR promotion efforts meet resistance by Azerbaijan. 
Therefore, perhaps, if the EU wishes to develop a truly equal partnership, it could consider to 
leave behind its Eurocentric view (Korosteleva 2012, 130, 136) and to  ‘ƵƉĚĂƚĞ ? ŝƚƐ ƐĞůĨ-
perception of holding ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ ? ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ?ǀĂůƵĞƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂůůŽǁƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ƚĂŬŝŶŐ
ƉůĂĐĞ ? zĞƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ h ? ǀŝĞǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶŝ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ĂƐ Ă ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ  ‘KƚŚĞƌ ? ƚŽ ǁŚŽŵ
concessions on DHR could be made, would be very hard to defend on a domestic and 
international level. Hence the EU is confronted with a dilemma: neither of the two policy 
strategies is optimal.   
To close on a positive note: both sides have expressed the view that even if there is 
much disagreement and progress is slow, the most important thing is that there is contact 




(interview with EEAS official 4, July 2014; interview with Azerbaijani government 
representative 2, July 2014). Disengagement is not seen as a solution to the disagreement on 
policies (interview with EEAS official 4, July 2014). The future will show whether or not the EU 




1. For reasons of confidentiality all references to specific interviews are anonymised.  
2. See the introduction to this volume 
3. Yet criticism can be heard too: those released were ĚƵďďĞĚ ‘ĐĞůĞďƌŝƚǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐ ?
by opposition party members; many others do not receive such international media 
attention, particularly not religious political prisoners, and their cases are not being 
considered equally by external actors (Safarova 2016). 
4.  For instance, the continued dialogue under the bilateral framework makes Azerbaijan 
different to Belarus, which presently does not have formal bilateral relations with the EU. 
5. While Member States may have an independent and divergent policy towards Azerbaijan, 
in this analysis they are included to the extent that they contribute to the EU common 
policy in relations with Baku. 
6  ?^ĞĞ<ŽƐƚĂŶǇĂŶ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌŝŶƚŚŝƐǀŽůƵŵĞ ? 
7 ?&ŽƌĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶŝĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚy, see also Böttger and 
Falkenhein 2011. 
8. Even though the official EU policy states that civil society should be included in these 
discussions (expert interview 1, May 2014).  
9. A more in-ĚĞƉƚŚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ<ŽƌŽƐƚĞůĞǀĂ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐ
special issue. 
10. WůĞĂƐĞƐĞĞƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ<ŽƌŽƐƚĞůĞǀĂ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞŝŶƚŚŝƐǀŽůƵŵĞĨŽƌfurther 
explanation of the concept of othering and its various forms. 
11. It should be noted here that generally, there appears to be a good level of understanding 
ŽĨǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂŶĚĂŵŽƌĞƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐǀŝĞǁŽŶĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?
withiŶƚŚĞ hĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶĂŬƵĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ ŝŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŵďĂƐƐŝĞƐ ŝŶǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ
(interviews with Member State officials 2, May 2014; 7, May 2014; 3, May 2014). But this 
understanding does not always seem to be incorporated by the EEAS Headquarters and 
memďĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ŝŶ ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ? ǁŚŽ ĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ ĚĞĐŝĚĞ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ
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For reasons of confidentiality, names and affiliations of interviewees remain anonymous. For 
this paper a total of 19 persons have been interviewed with a total of 36 hours of conversation. 
Among those quoted in this paper, 9 persons were representatives of or affiliated with EU 
institutions; 3 persons were representatives of or affiliated with the government of Azerbaijan; 
and 4 interviewees were independent experts. 
